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INTRODUCTION

The search for oil and gas involves tremendous expense and, traditionally, a vast element of chance.' Because of these factors, Texas
follows the rule of capture.2 Under the rule of capture, the one who
captures fugitive oil and gas and brings it to the surface owns it.3
However, problems can arise where mineral interests are undivided or
there are prior reservations that fractionalize the royalty ownership.'
This paper will examine the law regarding fractionalized royalty interests, how these interests may be captured or burdened by oil and gas
leases and other agreements, and the right of the fractionalized royalty owner to receive and share in royalty.
11.

METHODS OF POOLING AND PROBLEMS CREATED THEREBY

One reason pooling became so common, besides regulatory issues
concerning minimum well spacing, was the judicially created doctrine
of non-apportionment. Pooling, either in the traditional sense or
through a community lease, can result in the capture of otherwise unburdened interests. Interests may also be captured by including an
entirety clause in the lease. Where interests are captured, problems
frequently arise with respect to whom is entitled to royalty and in

what proportion the royalty should be paid.6

A.

The Rule of Non-apportionment

Where a mineral lessor sells a portion of the land to another, and oil
and gas is thereafter produced from the leased premises, the royalty
therefrom belongs to the owner of the tract from which the produc1. Japhet v. McRae, 276 S.W. 669, 671-72 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1925, judgm't
adopted).
2. Id. at 671.
3. Id.
4. See generally Laura H. Burney, Interpreting Mineral and Royalty Deeds: The
Legacy of the One-Eighth Royalty and Other Stories, 33 ST. MARY's L.J. 1 (2001).
5. Bruce M. Kramer, The Nuts and Bolts of Pooling: A Primerfor the Uninitiated, State Bar of Texas 24th Annual Advanced Oil, Gas and Energy Resources Law
Course (2006).
6. Burney, supra note 4.
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tion is obtained.7 This is the rule of non-apportionment.8 It is derived
from the rule of capture and is illustrated by the following case.9
1. Japhet v. McRae, 276 S.W. 669 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1925,
judgm't adopted).
This case stands for the proposition that absent contractual authority to the contrary, and where there is an oil and gas lease in place and
a portion of the leased premises is later sold or partitioned, production belongs to the mineral owner of the tract from which the production is produced.10
Fisher signed an oil and gas lease for fifteen (15) acres." Thereafter, Fisher sold five (5) of the 15 acres to Keeble. Keeble sold three
(3) undivided acres out of the 5 to McRae.12 Later, Fisher sold the
remaining ten (10) acres to Keeble, who, in turn, and on the very same
day, sold them to Japhet." Nothing in the deeds provided for the apportionment of royalty, i.e., an entireties clause.14 After Japhet
bought his 10 acres, he persuaded the lessee to develop his land, which
resulted in much oil being discovered on the 10 acres."s McRae and
Keeble filed suit seeking 5/15 of the 1/8 royalty from the production,
although their 5 acres were never developed.16 The trial court denied
recovery and awarded all of the royalty to Japhet, who owned the land
where the producing well was drilled." The Court of Appeals reversed and held that the royalty should be apportioned between Japhet, McRae, and Keeble. 8
The Commission of Appeals reversed and held that McRae and
Keeble, owners of the non-drill-site tract, were not entitled to any royalty from the production of oil on the neighboring tract.' 9 In reaching
its decision, the Commission of Appeals noted that oil and gas is a
part of the realty until it is brought to the surface, and that it can be
bought and sold in place.2 0 Japhet bought the realty in the 10 acres,
which included 1/8 of the oil and gas in and under the land.2 While
the lessee bought title to the oil through the oil and gas lease, Japhet
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Japhet, 276 S.W. at 670.
Id. at 699.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 670.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 671.
Id.
Id.
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retained the right to his 1/8 share once it was brought to the surface.2 2
The law does not presume that the oil produced from the 10 acres was
drained from the 5 acres and absent proof of drainage, Keeble and
McRae were not be entitled to share in the production.2 3
Pooling is the bringing together of small tracts sufficient for the
granting of a well permit under the applicable spacing rules.2 4 The
purpose of pooling is to prevent the physical and economic waste that
accompanies the drilling of unnecessary wells.2 A second purpose is
to protect the correlative rights of landowners over a particular reservoir. 2 6 Texas courts have held that pooling effects a cross-conveyance
among the owners of minerals under the various tracts, or royalty or
minerals in a pool, so that they all own undivided interests under the
pooled tract in the proportion their contribution bears to the overall
pool.27 A lease's pooling clause authorizes the lessee to pool the lessor's interests without the further consent of the lessor.
Unitization, on the other hand, is the joint operation of all or some
part of a producing reservoir. The purpose is to permit the entire
field, or a substantial portion of it, to be operated as a single entity,
without regard to surface boundary lines. Therefore, unitization refers to the combination of most, if not all, of the separate tracts in the
field into one tract so that the reservoir may be operated without regard to surface property lines.28
Absent express authority, a lessee cannot pool the lessor's interests
with the interests of others.2 9 Therefore, in order for pooling to be
valid, it must be done in accordance with the method and purposes
specified in the lease.3 0 In other words, the lessor's land may be
pooled only to the extent stipulated in the lease.3 ' Because pooling of
oil and gas interests is a matter of contract, an oil and gas lessee has
no right to modify those terms through a subsequent, unilateral action
unit designation.3 2
22. Id.
23. Id. at 671-72.
24. Whelan v. Manziel, 314 S.W.2d 126, 132 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1958,
writ refd n.r.e.).
25. See, e.g., Wagner & Brown, Ltd. v. Sheppard, 282 S.W.3d 419, 420-21 (Tex.

2007).
26. Id. at 424.
27. Montgomery v. Rittersbacher, 424 S.W.2d 210, 213 (Tex. 1968); Minchen v.
Fields, 345 S.W.2d 282, 285 (Tex. 1961); Brown v. Smith, 174 S.W.2d 43, 46 (Tex.
1943); Veal v. Thomason, 159 S.W.2d 472, 475-76 (Tex. 1942).
28. Id.
29. Se. Pipe Line Co. v. Tichacek, 997 S.W.2d 166, 170 (Tex. 1999); Browning Oil
Co., v. Luecke, 38 S.W.3d 625, 640 (Tex. App.-Austin 2000, pet. denied).
30. Jones v. Killingsworth, 403 S.W.2d 325, 328 (Tex. 1965).
31. Id.
32. Union Gas Corp. v. Gisler, 129 S.W.3d 145, 151 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
2003, no pet.).
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A typical pooling clause may read as follows: "Lessee, at its option,
is hereby given the right and power to pool or combine the acreage
covered by this lease or any portion thereof as to oil and gas, or either
of them, with any other land covered by this lease or with any other
land, lease, or leases in the immediate vicinity thereof . . . ."

Because pooling effects a cross-conveyance of interests and allows
the lessee to combine two or more tracts without the further consent
of its lessors, pooling can result in the dilution of interests where
smaller tracts are joined together to form large units. One way to
limit the lessee's power to pool where larger acreage is involved is to
include an anti-dilution provision in the lease."
Where the royalty interest is fractionalized through one or more
non-executive interests, issues can arise regarding the entitlement to
royalty. In many cases, the parties can resolve those issues through
ratification as discussed below in Sections III and IV.
B.

Community Leases

A community lease is a form of voluntary pooling agreement. In
essence, a community lease is a single lease that covers two or more
tracts executed by the separate landowners as if they were joint owners of the entire leased premises.3 A community lease may also entail
the execution of separate, but identical, leases by the owners of separate tracts individually where each lease covers the entire consolidated
acreage.
Executing a community lease normally results in the apportionment
of royalties among the several lessors in proportion to their acreage
interests in the entire tract and permits the lessee to operate the premises without regard to internal boundary lines." Community leases
are not common, but have seen a rise in popularity in urban leasing
situations involving homeowners and other associations seeking to
lease small tracts in bulk to increase negotiating power.
Absent some form of Pugh clause or continuous development/retained acreage provision, production from any tract within the community lease will extend the lease as to all tracts covered by the
lease.
33. See e.g., Sabre Oil & Gas Corp. v. Gibson, 72 S.W.3d 812, 816-17 (Tex. App.Eastland 2002, pet. denied).
34. Ruiz v. Martin, 559 S.W.2d 839, 842 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1977, writ
ref d n.r.e.).
35. Id.
36. French v. George, 159 S.W.2d 566, 569 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1942, writ
ref d).
37. See Lisa Vaughn, New Facets of Old Alternatives for Unleased Mineral Interests, 16 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REv. 113, 114 (2009).
38. Utley v. Marathon Oil Co., 31 S.W.3d 274, 280 (Tex. App.-Waco 2000, no
pet.).
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The rule of non-apportionment, announced in Japhet v. McRae, applies to situations in which a tract out of a community lease is severed,
provided that all of the parties to the lease join in or consent to the
severance. 3 9 Thus, in cases where the doctrine applies, production
from the severed tract belongs to the owners of the minerals under the
producing tract.4 0
C. The Entirety Clause
An entirety clause is yet another way to combine or join royalty
interests that would otherwise be subject to the non-apportionment
rule of Japhet v. McRae.4 ' An entirety clause typically provides that
royalties will be paid based on the ownership of the entire leased
premises, and not on who owns the land upon which the minerals are
produced.42 In essence, it is a pooling of the leased premises by the
mineral owners for royalty purposes.43
Entirety clauses were designed to prevent the need to drill unnecessary wells due to the implied covenant to protect against drainage.44
Over time, lessors began inserting language regarding the non-apportionment of royalty to ensure that if a partition/severance divided the
leased premises, that they would receive their pro rata share of the
royalty from a producing well on the other partitioned/severed tract.4 5
There are two basic methods of drafting an entirety clause, as
demonstrated below:
* "If the leased premises are hereafter owned in severalty or separate tracts . . . "46

* "If the leased premises are now or hereafter owned in separate
tracts . . ."47
The rest might read

...

the premises shall be developed and oper-

ated as one lease or as an entirety, and royalties accruing thereunder
shall be divided among and paid to such separate owners in the proportion that the acreage owned by them bears to the entire leased
premises. "48
39. See Garza v. De Montalvo, 217 S.W.2d 988, 993 (Tex. 1949).
40. Id.
41. Montgomery v. Rittersbacher, 410 S.W.2d 925, 928 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus
Christi 1966), rev'd on other grounds, 424 S.W.2d 210, 213 (Tex. 1968).
42. See Thomas Gilcrease Found. v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 266 S.W.2d 850, 851
(Tex. 1954).
43. Compare Montgomery, 410 S.W.2d at 928, with Brown v. Smith, 174 S.W.2d
43, 46 (Tex. 1943).
44. See Amoco Prod. Co. v. Alexander, 622 S.W.2d 563, 567 (Tex. 1981).
45. See Montgomery, 410 S.W.2d at 927.
46. See Turner v. Brookshear, 271 F.2d 761, 762 (10th Cir. 1959).
47. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, TRAINING
PUBL'N No. 3149-125, MARKET SEGMENT SPECIALIZATION PROGRAM: OIL & GAS
INDUSTRY 1-15, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-mssp/oilgas.pdf.
48. See Turner, 271 F.2d at 762; See also Stroud v. D-X Sunray Oil Co., 876 P.2d
1015, 1017 (Okla. 1962).
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The Texas Supreme Court has held that an "are now" entirety
clause applies to minerals held in severalty at the time of the execution of the lease.4 9
Issues can arise where a portion of the land covered by an oil and
gas lease is sold and the lease contains an entirety clause and is subject
to an outstanding non-participating royalty interest. For instance,
what happens where the non-participating royalty interest is in the
non-drill-site tract? Does the entirety clause bind the non-participating royalty interest owner's royalty, or does the non-participating royalty owner have to ratify the lease as to the drill-site tract in order to
receive royalty? This issue was addressed in Montgomery v. Rittersbacher and is discussed in Section IV(E)(1).s0
III.

THE RIGHT TO ROYALTY

As demonstrated above, oil and gas lessees have many tools for
joining or combining different mineral interests and acreage in order
to drill and produce a prospect. However, joining these interests can
create special problems concerning the competing interests involved.
For example, it has long been the law in Texas that a lease executed by
the owner of the executive right, when there is an outstanding nonparticipating interest, binds the interest of the non-participating royalty owner.5 However, can the executive nonetheless dilute the nonparticipating royalty owner's interest by pooling that interest with
other lands or leases?
Texas law is clear: pooling on the part of the executive holder does
not bind the non-participating royalty owner's interest in the absence
of consent or acquiescence by the royalty owner.5 2 The result is no
different with respect to an entirety clause. In either case, the consent
of the non-participating royalty interest owner must be obtained.5 3
This is because, under Texas law, only an owner may convey his or her
interest in land, 5 4 and a non-participating royalty interest is an interest
in land.55 Moreover, the mere reservation of a non-participating royalty interest under a tract does not show that the reserving owner intended to give the holder of the executive right the power to diminish
the royalty owner's interest under that tract.
49. Montgomery v. Rittersbacher, 424 S.W.2d 210, 213 (Tex. 1968) (citing Thomas
Gilcrease Found. v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 266 S.W.2d 850, 853 (Tex. 1954)).
50. Id. at 212.
51. Id.
52. Rittersbacher, 424 S.W.2d at 213; Brown v. Smith, 174 S.W.2d 43, 46 (Tex.
1943).
53. Rittersbacher,424 S.W.2d at 213.
54. Union Pac. Res. Co. v. Hutchison, 990 S.W.2d 368, 370-71 (Tex. App.-Austin
1999, pet. denied)
55. Brown, 174 S.W.2d at 46.
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The Non-participatingRoyalty Interest Owner

As stated, the rule in Texas is that the holder of the executive right
has the power to execute oil and gas leases, but cannot pool or unitize
an outstanding non-participating royalty interest absent joinder or ratification by the non-participating royalty interest owner. 5 6 In situations where a royalty reservation predates an oil and gas lease that
contains a pooling clause, the lease amounts to a proposal or offer by
the lessor to the outstanding non-participating royalty interest owner
to effect or create a community lease and to pool or unitize all of the
royalties in all of the tracts described in the lease. To successfully ratify the lease, all non-participating royalty owners must ratify." The
following cases illustrate these principles.
1. Ruiz v. Martin, 559 S.W.2d 839 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
This case stands for two propositions: (i) the holder of the executive
interest does not have the power to pool the interest of a non-participating royalty interest owner absent consent or acquiescence, and (ii)
a lease by the executive that contains a pooling provision constitutes
an offer to lease that the non-participating royalty interest owner can
reject or accept by timely ratification."
This oil and gas lease involved three separate tracts totaling 600
acres owned by Ruiz." Martin owned an undivided 1/2 interest in the
oil royalties, gas royalties, and royalties in other minerals in a 463.8
acre tract, described as Tract 1 in the lease.60 The royalty was a perpetual, non-participating royalty interest, and it was outstanding at the
time that the oil and gas lease was taken. 6 1 During the lease term, a
producing well was drilled on Tract 2.62 Ruiz asserted that he was
entitled to 100% of the royalty from the producing well on Tract 2.63
Martin asserted that he was entitled to a share of the royalty from
Tract 2.64 The trial court entered judgment that Martin was entitled to
.3865 (1/2 x 463.8/600) of the royalty on all oil, gas, and other minerals
produced from the well from and after December 9, 1974, which was
the date that Martin alleged to have ratified the lease.65
56. Rittersbacher, 424 S.W.2d at 213; Brown, 174 S.W.2d at 46.
57. Guar. Nat'l Bank & Trust of Corpus Christi v. May, 395 S.W.2d 80, 82 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Waco 1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
58. Ruiz v. Martin, 559 S.W.2d 839 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1977, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
59. Id. at 840.
60. Id
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 841.
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The Court of Appeals affirmed.6 6 In support of its holding, the
Court of Appeals noted that an ordinary oil and gas lease, when executed by all the owners of different mineral interests in two or more
tracts, effectively pools the royalties payable under the lease.6 7 The
court then stated that the executive holder had the right to execute an
oil and gas lease to burden the mineral interest, but did not have the
authority or power to pool or unitize the royalty interest of the nonparticipating royalty interest holder without their joinder or ratification.68 In essence, the oil and gas lease amounted to a proposal or
offer by the executive holder/lessor to the lessee and the non-participating royalty interest owners to pool or unitize all of the royalties in
the tracts subject to the lease. 69 Because the non-participating royalty
owners timely ratified the lease, they were entitled to receive their
proportionate share of the royalty produced from the leased
premises.7 0
2.

Guaranty Nat'l Bank & Trust of Corpus Christi v. May, 395

S.W.2d 80 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
This case involved an oil and gas lease that covered five separate
tracts. May owned the surface and executive right to lease all five
tracts.72 May executed an oil and gas lease that granted the lessee the
right and power to pool the acreage under the lease with other acreage to form communitized units. The royalty interests under the five
tracts were split between May, Brookshire, Koch, and Hampton.7 4 A
producing well was drilled on Tract 3, which royalty interest was
owned by May and Koch. Brookshire and Hampton ratified May's
lease. Koch refused.76 The trial court held that the lease was not a
communitized lease, and that there was no cross-conveyance of
interests.
The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the parties could not
unitize or communitize the respective royalty interest without the
joinder or ratification of all of the royalty owners. In other words,
ratification by less than all of the owners does not effectuate the pool66. Id. at 842.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 842-43.
69. Id. at 843.
70. Id.
71. Guar. Nat'1 Bank & Trust of Corpus Christi v. May, 395 S.W.2d 80 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Waco 1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 80-81.
74. Id. at 81.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 82.
78. Id.
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ing and thus, the law does not recognize a communitization of
interests.7 9
B.

OverridingRoyalty Interests

Consider the royalty due, if any, to an overriding royalty interest
owner when the lease in which the interest is created out of is pooled
and a producing well is drilled on acreage not otherwise subject to the
lease. Is the overriding royalty interest owner entitled to any royalty,
or does the overriding royalty interest owner have to ratify the pooled
unit in order to participate?
Under Texas law, and absent contractual language to the contrary,
the owner of the lease can pool an overriding royalty owner's interests
without its consent and thus dilute the overriding royalty owner's interest in production.so The law treats these interests differently than
non-executive interests because they stem from the same instrument
that generally allows the lessee to pool the leased premises.
C.

Co-tenancy and the Right to Royalty

As a general rule, a tenant in common has the absolute right to
execute a lease on his undivided interest in the common property, notwithstanding the nonjoinder of his co-tenant.8 2 A tenant in common
can also pool its interest with other leases and lands. 83 In such situations, what right, if any, does the unleased co-tenant have to royalty?
Does that person get to share in production from the pooled unit?
The short answer is-it depends.
1. The Unleased Co-tenant
Generally, if production is obtained from a well drilled on the unleased co-tenant's land, and the unleased co-tenant refuses to ratify
the lease or designation of pooled unit, the lessee will be required to
account to the unleased co-tenant for his or her share of production
after the lessee recovers its drilling costs.84 If, however, production is
obtained from a well drilled on land in which the unleased co-tenant
does not own an interest, i.e., one of the other pooled tracts, the unleased co-tenant can only share in the production if he or she ratifies
79. Id.
80. Union Pac. Res. Co. v. Hutchinson, 990 S.W.2d 368, 371 (Tex. App.-Austin
1999, pet. denied).
81. Id.
82. Whelan v. Placid Oil Co., 274 S.W.2d 125, 128 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana
1954, writ ref d n.r.e.).
83. Id.
84. Wagner & Brown, Ltd. v. Sheppard, 282 S.W.3d 419, 426 (Tex. 2007); Cox v.
Davison, 397 S.W.2d 200, 201 (Tex. 1965).
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the co-tenant's lease, or ratifies the designation of pooled unit." This
is essentially the holding from Superior Oil Co. v. Roberts."
a. Superior Oil Co. v. Roberts, 398 S.W.2d 276 (Tex. 1966).
This case stands for the proposition that an unleased co-tenant, who
refuses to ratify its co-tenant's lease or the designation of pooled unit,
is not entitled to share in production obtained from the pooled unit if
the drill site and well bore are located on land other than the unleased
co-tenant's. 8 7
Superior acquired an oil and gas lease covering 1.5 acres of land
consisting of six separate lots out of Block W of the Hawley Addition
in Altair, Colorado County, Texas." Superior's lessor owned 1/2 of
the minerals under the town lots while the other 1/2 interest was
owned by the plaintiffs." The plaintiffs did not seek to ratify or adopt
their co-tenant's leases with Superior, nor did they claim to be tenants
in common with their co-mineral owners. 90 Rather, their theory was
that they were a co-tenant with Superior and that by the pooling of
the lots with other lands from which production was obtained, they
were entitled to share in the production as if it were actual production
from the six town lots. 91 The trial court and the Court of Appeals
held that the plaintiffs/unleased co-tenants were entitled to share in
production obtained from the pooled unit.9 2
The Texas Supreme Court reversed and rendered, rejecting the
plaintiffs' theory.93 In reaching its holding that the plaintiffs were not
entitled to sales proceeds from production, the Court noted that any
action taken by Superior concerning its lessors' leases could not operate to place the plaintiffs' property under lease or otherwise make it
part of the unitized area without the plaintiffs' consent or acquiescence.9 4 The plaintiffs had no contractual relationship with Superior
which would give them rights in and to minerals produced from the
pooled unit, but not their land. 95 Because the plaintiffs made no attempt to ratify their co-tenants' mineral leases with Superior and because none of the production came from their land, they were not
entitled to production from the unit.96
85. Sun Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Pitzer, 822 S.W.2d 294 (Tex. App.-Eastland
1991, writ denied); Donnan v. Atl. Richfield, 732 S.W.2d 715, 717 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1987, writ denied).
86. Superior Oil Co. v. Roberts, 398 S.W.2d 276 (Tex. 1966).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 276-77.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 277.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 278.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
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2. Pooling and Lease Termination: Who Gets the Royalty?
Consider the following situation and the effect on the right to royalty. Tract 1 consists of sixty acres with X owning 1/8 and Y owning 7/
8. X and Y sign separate leases with different lessees. Significantly,
however, both leases allow the lessees to pool "the leased premises or
interest therein with any other lands or interests."9 7 The lessees sign a
unit designation and pool the 60 acres with another 120 acres to form
a 180 acre unit. A producing well is drilled solely on the 60 acres.
Due to special provisions in the X's lease regarding when royalty must
be paid, the lease terminates.
Therefore, the question is what is the effect, if any, of X's lease
termination in regards to the pooled unit? Does the unit terminate?
Is X now an unleased co-tenant, who would otherwise be entitled to 1/
8 of the total production after the lessee recovers its drilling costs?
The answer is no-X is not entitled to 1/8 of the total production.
Rather, X is only entitled to receive her pro rata share of production
from the unit multiplied by her 1/8 mineral interest: 1/8 x 60/180 =
4.166%. This essentially is the situation in Wagner & Brown, Ltd. v.
Sheppard.98
a. Wagner & Brown, Ltd. v. Sheppard, 282 S.W.3d 419 (Tex. 2008).
In Wagner, the trial court found that termination of Sheppard's
lease also terminated her participation in the unit, and the Court of
Appeals affirmed. 99 The Texas Supreme Court reversed and held that
termination of Sheppard's lease did not invalidate the pooling agreement and hence, Sheppard was not entitled to an undiluted 1/8 of production.10 0 Sheppard's share of production, even though it was
obtained from wells drilled on her land, would be allocated based on
the acreage in the pooled unit and her 1/8 mineral interest.10 ' In
reaching its decision, the Texas Supreme Court noted that a lease is
not necessarily required for pooling, and that mineral owners can join
in pooling even if no lease exists, i.e., they can ratify the unit (ratification was not an issue in Wagner. Sheppard asserted a right to 1/8 of
the total production from her land as an unleased co-tenant). 0 2 The
Court went on to state that although Sheppard's lease had terminated,
the lands themselves did not, and while termination of the lease
changed who owned the mineral interests in the unit, it did not cause
the unit to terminate because it was a pooling of lands, not just
leases. 03 The Court then distinguished Texaco, Inc. v. Lettermann on
97. See Wagner & Brown, Ltd. v. Sheppard, 282 S.W.3d 419, 422 (Tex. 2008).
98. Id. at 419.
99. Id. at 422.

100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 424.
103. Id. at 425-27.
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the ground that the lease in that case only authorized the pooling of
the gas leasehold estate of adjacent lands, while the lease in Wagner
allowed the pooling of the leased premises or interest therein with any
other lands or interests. 104 Finally, the Court noted that Sheppard's
possibility of reverter upon lease termination was an interest in the
leased premises and that she had granted the lessee the right to pool
her interest, including the possibility of reverter, in the leased
premises.os

IV.

RATIFICATION

As shown above, ratification is the key that unlocks the royalty
door for non-executive interests owners and owners of undivided, unleased mineral interests. Yet many questions can arise regarding ratification. For instance, when does ratification occur? How do you
ratify? Can you ratify part of a lease, but disclaim the pooling clause
or the entirety clause? How long do you have to ratify? When do
royalties begin accruing for the benefit of the ratifying party?
A.

Ratification in General

Ratification is the adoption or confirmation by a person, with
knowledge of all material facts, of a prior act which did not then legally bind that person and which that person had the right to
repudiate.1 0 6
Ratification has the effect of prior authority.10 7 In other words,
where ratification is applicable, the effect is the same as execution of
the original lease. 08 A party may ratify a lease, as a matter of law, by
filing suit to enforce the lease as written.109
B.

Ratification by Accepting Royalty Payments

Ratification can occur through the acceptance of royalty payments
even if the payments are accepted under protest or with a reservation
of rights."o
104. Id. at 423 (citing Texaco, Inc. v. Lettermann, 343 S.W.2d 726 (Tex. Civ. App.Amarillo 1961, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
105. Id. at 424.
106. Vessels v. Anschutz Corp., 823 S.W.2d 762, 764 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1992,
writ denied); Kunkel v. Kunkel, 515 S.W.2d 941, 948 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974,
writ ref'd n.r.e.) (op. on reh'g).
107. Yelderman v. McCarthy, 474 S.W.2d 781, 784 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
108. Ruiz v. Martin, 559 S.W.2d 839, 844 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1977, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
109. Montgomery v. Rittersbacher, 424 S.W.2d 210, 214 (Tex. 1968).
110. Yelderman, 474 S.W.2d at 784.
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1. Yeldeman v. McCarthy, 474 S.W.2d 781 (Tex. Civ. App.Houston [1st Dist.] 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
Yeldeman stands for the proposition that a lessor may ratify an otherwise invalid pooled unit by accepting production payments under
protest."' This was a suit to recover royalties alleged to be due under
the terms of an oil and gas lease."12 The principal issue involved was
the validity of a gas unit created under the authority of a unitization
provision in an oil and gas lease, which covered the plaintiffs' 3/4 mineral interest in 225.24 acres."' The lessee drilled a well on the leased
premises and subsequently recorded a unit designation pooling 117.03
acres from the leased premises with adjacent land to form a 346.82
acre unit.1 14 The oil and gas lease provided for units not exceeding
640 acres, plus 10% tolerance, unless otherwise allowed by governmental authority.115 The lease also specified that in creating any unit,
the lessee was limited to creating units that would not exceed the minimum size tract upon which a well may be drilled in order to conform
to the spacing pattern prescribed in the field by regulatory agencies
having jurisdiction.11 6 When the well was drilled, the minimum size
tract upon which a well could be drilled was forty acres as prescribed
by Statewide Rule 37 of the Texas Railroad Commission, but special
field rules applicable to this well allowed a minimum drilling unit of
320 acres."' Therefore, the unit designation of 346.82 acres was not
effective and did not accomplish the pooling of acreage."18 Even
though the unit failed, the lessee tendered royalty payments to the
lessors in accordance with the lessors' proportionate share of royalty
as if the unit was indeed effective." 9 The lessors cashed those payments with a notation "accepted as partial payment only as per lease
agreement."1 2 0 The trial court entered judgment for the defendant/
lessee that the plaintiff/lessor take nothing on its claim for additional
royalty for unpaid production.121
The Court of Appeals affirmed, relying on Leopard v. Stanolind Oil
& Gas Co., 220 S.W.2d 259 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1949, writ ref'd
n.r.e.), and held that the acceptance of royalty checks, even under protest, was a ratification of the unit.12 2 The Court of Appeals reasoned
that the authority in the lease to pool the lessors' interest made the
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id.

781-82.
782.

782-83.
783.
784.
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lessee the lessor's agent and as the agent, the lessee had the ability to
convey royalty interests in the subject lease to the owners of other
mineral interests. 123 The Court of Appeals then determined that the
lessors had ratified the unauthorized action of its agent by accepting
the benefits flowing from the unauthorized pooling-cashing the royalty payments, which were based on the allocated acreage in the overall pool.124
C.

Ratification by Filing Suit

A person may ratify an oil and gas lease by filing a pleading in a
lawsuit that puts the opposing party on notice that the person intends
to ratify and be bound by the terms of the oil and gas lease.12 5
D.

Ratification and Timing

Issues can arise whether a purported ratification is valid when there
has been a long passage of time between the ratifying act and the date
that production began or the party seeking to ratify learned of facts
sufficient to ratify. At least one case stands for the proposition that a
party seeking to ratify must exercise its right without undue delay. 126
1. Nugent v. Freeman, 306 S.W.2d 167 (Tex. Civ. App.Eastland 1957, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
Nugent involved a royalty suit and stands for the proposition that in
order to ratify a pooled unit by filing suit, the party seeking to ratify
must act with diligence and not unreasonable delay.12 7 It is an issue of
laches, not estoppel, as stated in May v. Cities Serv. Oil Co.'2 8
Nugent conveyed thirty acres to Freeman and reserved a 1/16 nonparticipating royalty interest in the land.129 At that time, Freeman
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Wood, 113 S.W.3d 462, 466-67 (Tex. App.-Texarkana
2003, no pet.).
126. Nugent v. Freeman, 306 S.W.2d 167, 170-71 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1957,
writ ref'd n.r.e.). But see Montgomery v. Rittersbacher, 424 S.W.2d 210 (Tex. 1968).
In that case, a well was drilled in October 1956. Id. at 212. Commercial production
began in May 1958. Id. Suit was not filed, however, until May 1964, some six years
later. Id. The Texas Supreme Court held that the plaintiff had ratified the lease and
thus, was entitled to his share of the royalty as a non-participating royalty interest
owner. Id. at 215. Importantly, and even though suit was not filed for six years, the
record on appeal showed that in January 1959, the plaintiff made a demand upon the
operator for his pro-rata share of the royalties due and owing under the lease. Id. at
214. Specifically, the plaintiff offered to sign a ratification and sign a division order of
interests. Id.
127. Nugent, 306 S.W.2d at 170-71.
128. See May v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 444 S.W.2d 822, 826 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
129. Id. at 168.
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owned another 120 acres that joined the 30 acres. 3 o Freeman later
executed an oil and gas lease covering the entire 150 acres."' The 150
acres was described in the lease under a single description.132 Three
wells were drilled, but none of the wells were on the 30 acres conveyed to Freeman by Nugent.133 The parties stipulated that Nugent
had actual knowledge not later than August 1953 that oil was being
produced from the 120 acres.134 Nugent never signed a lease, never
was requested to sign a lease, and never offered to sign a lease.
Likewise, Nugent never signed a ratification of the lease and never
executed any instrument pertaining to the lease or the pooling of the
two tracts involved.136 There was nothing in the lease to indicate that
Nugent was to get less than his 1/16th of the oil produced from the 30
acres or that Nugent was to get any royalty from the 120 acre tract.137
On December 12, 1955, over three years from the stipulated date of
actual awareness, Nugent filed suit claiming a royalty interest in the
production from the 120 acre tract. 38 Nugent alleged that by signing
the lease with a single property description, Freeman had essentially
pooled the 30 acre tract with the 120 acre tract.139 The trial court
entered judgment for Freeman.140
The Court of Appeals affirmed and held that Freeman had no authority to pool Nugent's royalty interest in the thirty-acre tract without Nugent's consent.141 The court then considered if Freeman had
no power to pool, when, and in what manner, was the pooling of Nugent's interest in the thirty acres affected.142 Nugent argued that by
filing suit, he ratified the unauthorized act of Freeman. 143 The Court
of Appeals rejected that argument. 4 4 The court reasoned that Nugent waited more than two years to file suit after receiving actual
knowledge that oil was being produced from the 120 acre tract.145
During this time period, all of the royalty was paid to the owners of
the 120 acre tract.14 6 The court noted that had production been obtained from the thirty-acre tract, Nugent would undoubtedly have
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id. at 169.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 170-71.
Id. at 171.
Id.
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been entitled to his 1/16th royalty. 14 7 However, because Nugent
waited so long to bring suit, the lease had been fully developed and
therefore, Nugent could not complain or seek to ratify. 4 8
E.

Effect of Ratification: Post Production Royalties Only

Once ratification occurs, is the ratifying party entitled to pre or
post-ratification royalty or both? The prevailing view under Texas law
seems to be that a ratifying party is only entitled to post-ratification
royalties.14 9
1. Montgomery v. Rittersbacher, 424 S.W.2d 210 (Tex. 1968).
Montgomery stands for two propositions: (i) the holder of the executive right cannot enlarge or diminish the rights of a prior non-participating royalty interest owner where he or she executes an oil and gas
lease that contains either a pooling clause or an entirety clause, unless
the non-participating royalty interest owner ratifies such action; and
(ii) a party who ratifies a lease or unit is only entitled to receive royalties that accrue from and after the date of ratification.15 0
In 1945, Montgomery conveyed 80 acres of land and reserved for
himself a non-participating royalty interest in the land.' 5 ' Rittersbacher later acquired the 80 acres, which adjoined another 124.19
acres owned by him. 15 2 Montgomery owned no interest in this other
land.153 In 1953, Rittersbacher recorded an oil and gas lease covering
the 80 acres and the 124.19 acres.15 4 Montgomery, owning only a nonparticipating royalty interest, did not join in the execution of the
lease. 5 5 The lease defined the two tracts separately and contained a
pooling clause.156 The lease also contained an entirety clause that
stated as follows:
"If the leased premises are now or shall hereafter be owned in severalty or in separate tracts, the premises, nevertheless, shall be developed and operated as one lease, and all royalties accruing
hereunder shall be treated as an entirety and shall be divided among
and paid to such separate owners in the proportion that the acreage
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Montgomery v. Rittersbacher, 424 S.W.2d 210, 215 (Tex. 1968); May v. Cities
Serv. Oil Co., 444 S.W.2d 822, 827 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1969, writ refd n.r.e.).
But see Mallett v. Wheat, 709 S.W.2d 768, 772 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1986, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
150. Montgomery, 424 S.W.2d at 213-15.
151. Id. at 211.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 212.

156. Id.
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owned by each such separate owner bears to the entire leased
acreage." 57
A portion of the 124.19 acres was pooled with a tract known as the
Crutchfield tract, land not owned by Rittersbacher and not covered by
the 1953 lease. 58 Production was obtained from that unit.'5 9 Montgomery's 80 acres was placed in a unit in which a dry hole was
drilled.16 0
Montgomery sued and argued that he was entitled to royalty from
the Crutchfield unit by virtue of the entirety clause since a portion of
the 124.19 acres was pooled into the unit even though he did not own
any royalty interest in the 124.19 acres.161 Rittersbacher argued that
as the executive holder, he did not have the power or authority to
bind Montgomery's non-participating royalty interest with an entirety
clause.162 The trial court entered judgment that Montgomery take
nothing and the Court of Appeals affirmed.163
The Texas Supreme Court reversed and remanded.164 First, the
Texas Supreme Court held that Rittersbacher, being the holder of the
executive right, did not have the power to bind Montgomery's nonparticipating royalty interest by virtue of the entirety clause alone.'6 5
Second, the Texas Supreme Court held that Montgomery had properly ratified the lease. 66 The Texas Supreme Court went on to state
that it was of the opinion that the enlargement or diminishment of the
rights of a non-participating royalty interest owner can be accomplished by the holder of the executive right where he or she executes
an oil and gas lease that contains either a pooling clause or an entirety
clause, provided that the non-participating royalty interest owner rati-

fies such action.167
2. Mallett v. Wheat, 709 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1986,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
Mallett involved a trespass to try title, but it also touches on the
issue of royalty allocation and entitlement to royalty.168 Wheat filed
suit claiming title and right to possession of a 1/2 undivided interest in
13.76 acres.169 The defendants answered and also claimed title to and
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 211.
Id.
Id. at 213-14.
Id. at 214-15.
Id.
Mallett v. Wheat, 709 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1986, writ ref'd

n.r.e.).
169. Id. at 769.
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right to possession of the disputed tract by asserting a defense of limitations and laches.17 0 Prior to Wheat filing suit, Mallett signed an oil
and gas lease, which allowed the lessee to pool the leased premises
with other nearby property."' A producing well was drilled within
the unit, but outside the boundaries of the disputed tract. 172 Two
years after filing suit, Wheat ratified the leases and unitization agreement.173 At that point, the lessee deposited 1/2 of the royalties due to
the owners of the disputed tract from 1980 until the time of trial. 17 4
The trial court granted a directed verdict for the plaintiff on the title
issue and hence, awarded Wheat the royalties that had been paid into
the registry of the court.' 7 5 On appeal, Mallett argued that the trial
court erred in awarding Wheat royalties accruing prior to Wheat's ratification of the mineral leases.176
The Court of Appeals affirmed and held Wheat was entitled to royalties accruing prior to ratification of the leases. 7 In reaching its
holding, the Court of Appeals distinguished Superior Oil Co. v. Roberts, 398 S.W.2d 276 (Tex. 1966) and May v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 444
S.W.2d 822 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.) and
said that they did not deal with the situation at hand.178 Instead, the
court reasoned that because Mallett chose to deal with the disputed
tract as if he were its sole owner, and since Wheat ratified the leases
and unitization agreement, it would unjustly enrich Mallett to allow
him to keep any part of their co-tenant's share of the benefits of such
agreements.17 9 It seems that the better reasoning for allowing the
plaintiff to recover pre-ratification royalty is because of the title dispute and the fact that Mallett was held not to own anything and to
allow him to keep any royalty would unjustly enrich him.

V.

NECESSARY AND INDISPENSABLE PARTIES TO
ROYALTY LITIGATION

The case law on whether the court should join all persons who may
have an interest in the pooled/unitized unit is conflicting, but recent
cases seem to favor the non-joinder of such persons.

170. Id.
171. Id. at 771.

172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 769.
Id. at 771.
Id. at 772.
Id.
Id.
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A. Veal v. Thomason, 159 S.W.2d 472 (Tex. 1942).
Veal stands for the proposition that royalty owners who have unitized their mineral interests together are necessary and indispensable
parties in litigation when seeking to remove one of the individual
tracts from the unitized block.'
Thomason sued to recover title to and possession of land because of
certain alleged illegalities in a trustee's sale.' 8 ' The defendants had
acquired the property at the sale and had subsequently leased the
minerals to the Texas Company. 182 The land was unitized with some
6,000 acres.183 Thomason refused to name the other parties who had
executed leases in the unitized block and the trial court dismissed the
case, but the case was reversed on appeal.'" The Court of Appeals
held that the other lessors and royalty owners in the unitized block
were not necessary parties to the suit because they did not have a
direct interest in the land at issue.'8 5
The Texas Supreme Court reversed and held that the other owners
were indispensable parties because if the plaintiff's claims are successful, the other royalty owners would have had their royalty interest in
the tract at issue cut off and destroyed without having their day in
court.186
B.

Sabre Oil & Gas Corp. v. Gibson, 72 S.W.3d 812
(Tex. App.-Eastland 2002, pet. denied).

Sabre stands for the proposition that in a suit for bad faith pooling
and breach of lease, royalty interest owners whose interests had been
pooled were not necessary and indispensable parties such that they
would have to be joined in order for the case to proceed.'18
In 1957, an oil and gas lease covering thirty-eight separate tracts
was executed.18 8 The plaintiffs owned 100% of the minerals under
three of the thirty-eight tracts.' 8 9 The lessee drilled and completed a
gas well on one of the plaintiff's three tracts and thereafter, filed a
designation of pooled unit that pooled the plaintiff's three tracts with
other lands that were not part of the 1957 lease.190 The plaintiffs sued
180. Veal v. Thomason, 138 Tex. 341, 351, 159 S.W.2d 472, 477 (Tex. 1942), superseded by rule, Tex. R. Civ. P. 39(a), as recognized in Sabre Oil & Gas Corp. v. Gibson,
72 S.W.3d 812, 814 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2002, pet. denied).
181. Id. at 345, 159 S.W.2d at 474.
182. Id. at 343, 159 S.W.2d at 473.
183. Id. at 345, 159 S.W.2d at 474.
184. Id. at 346, 159 S.W.2d at 474.
185. Id. at 346, 159 S.W.2d at 474.
186. Id. at 351, 159 S.W.2d at 477.
187. Sabre Oil & Gas Corp. v. Gibson, 72 S.W.3d 812, 814 (Tex. App.-Eastland
2002, pet. denied).
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
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seeking a declaration that a lease had terminated as to their land and
that the lessee had formed a unit in violation of the lease thus making
it void.191 The plaintiffs refused to join some sixty other royalty interest owners who owned interests in the lands not included under the
1957 lease, but which had been pooled with the plaintiff's three
tracts. 192 The trial court found that the gas unit was formed in violation of the lease provisions and was void ab initio.' 93 The trial court
also denied the lessee's plea in abatement that the case should not go
forward until the sixty royalty interest owners were joined.19 4
The Court of Appeals overruled the lessee's argument that the trial
court erred in denying the lessee's plea in abatement.195 In reaching
its decision, the Court of Appeals noted that Veal v. Thomason was
decided prior to the 1971 amendment to Rule 39 of the Texas Rules of
Civil Procedure and that the rule no longer talked of "necessary" and
"indispensable" parties.' 96 Rather, Rule 39, as currently written, is a
looser standard that focuses not so much on the trial court's jurisdiction, but on whether the trial court should proceed with the parties
already before it.197 The Court of Appeals reasoned that the trial
court was able to provide the requested relief because joinder of the
other royalty interest owners was not necessary to determine whether
the lessee had pooled in bad faith or breached the terms of the underlying oil and gas lease even though the non-party royalty owners'
share of production could be affected if the pooled unit was declared
invalid.' 98
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 815.
Id.
Id. at 816.
Id.
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